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1. Introduction 
Contract theory suggests that in the presence of information incompleteness, property rights 
help to bring individuals with conflicting objectives within a contractual relationship into 
equilibrium (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  This paper examines the 
effects of property rights on incentivising risk-sharing in a principal-agent relationship that 
involves government as the principal and a private sector concessionaire as the agent to manage 
infrastructure-based service.  These concession contracts post a unique management challenge 
because regulating the service operated by a concessionaire must consider the degree to which 
the convergence of private objectives of the concessionaire towards the public objectives of the 
regulator can be achieved (de Palma et al., 2007, p. 9); under which the economics of incentives 
– described as “the design of rules and institutions for inducing economic agents to exert high 
level of effort (in broad sense), and to reveal truthfully all socially relevant information they 
might have” (Laffont, 1996, p. 49) must be carefully managed.  Research in contracts 
concerning the ownership-incentives tradeoff concentrates on relationships amongst 
stakeholders within the private sector; in this paper, the evaluation on how the economics of 
incentives can induce the agent to exert highly level of performance effort and to reveal their 
true behaviour through the concession of ownership from a regulator to a private entrepreneur 
makes it a significant contribution to the contract literature.  
Using empirical data collected through an online experiment surveying stakeholders from the 
public sector and from the private sector, who have been actively engaging in roads procured 
under the public-private-partnership (PPP) model, we study the following research question: 
 
In the presence of contract incompleteness, to what extent do property rights 
in the public-private-partnership concession model incentivise contractual 
efficiency? 
 
Specifically, we explore how would the incentive of property rights influence the agent’s choice 
for contract between structures with and without ownership concession; and their choice for 
contract between compensation structures with and without revenue-sharing.  We further study 
the degree to which the agent’s preference for exercising ownership right to regulate usage 
demand via toll prices; and both parties’ views on perceived accountability transfer.   
To proceed with the investigation, we require knowledge of: (1) the risks involved; (2) each 
contractual party’s risk preference; and (3) their willingness and ability to bear risks.  The 
identifications of risks pertaining to PPP roads and each party’s willingness and perceived 
ability to manage risks in Chung et al. (2010) provide a knowledge base to the first  and third 
requirements; they also provide the platform for knowledge gathering in relation to requirement 
two.  
Empirical studies on contract have so far assumed the stereotype risk-neutral principal and risk-
averse agent by taking the risk preferences of contracting parties as given (cf., Allen and Lueck, 
1999; Martimort and Pouyet, 2008; Chen and Chiu, 2010), or have used self-reported scale to 
measure risk preference (cf., Gaynor and Gertler, 1995; Jin and Doloi, 2008).  The first method 
has been under challenge by progresses made in cognitive science and management science on 
modelling human behaviour.  There is substantial theoretical and empirical evidence on risky 
behaviour that offers insights on what determines risk preferences.  Risk preferences are driven 
by a combination of influences, which have been described as situational factors such as 
problem framing (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), reference points (Lopes, 1987), levels of 
organisational slack (Cyert and March, 1963) and escalation of commitment (Brockner, 1992); 
and constant factors like individual dispositions (Laughhunn et al., 1980), national culture 
(Hofstede, 1980), and organisational culture (Morgan, 1986).  Risk perceptions were found to 
be diverse because they were influenced by value systems, and hence by attitudes, judgements, 
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emotions and beliefs of the individual (Edwards and Bowen, 2003).  Risk could be interpreted 
differently by different people (Rohrmann, 1994; Weber et al., 2002) and is contextually 
dependent (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979); therefore some risks would even mean different 
things to the same people at different times in their lives or under different circumstances 
(Edwards and Bowen, 2003, p. 85).  The self-reported scale is a representation of the reporting 
individual’s preference accumulated over actual experience; they are referred to revealed 
preference data in the choice literature.  Revealed preference (RP) data have the advantage of 
replicating real life experience, but they are bound by real constraints confronted by the same 
decision maker (Hensher et al., 2005, p. 92); therefore, the potentials to make predictions and 
improvements are limited because the data offer no innovations to the known information on 
what have occurred or currently exist. 
In order to obtain a “true” risk preference with greater relevance to the transaction context in 
PPP roads, we will need to empirically derive a set of PPP risk indices to the requirement of 
number two.  For this purpose, we have included in the online survey a series of stated-choice 
experiment to gather stated choice (SC) data on international stakeholder perceptions of risk 
associated with alternative packages of attributes that define the dimensions of PPP risk.  The 
experiment contains a number of hypothetical scenarios that are well-defined within the 
transaction context of PPP road contracts; this allows us to overcome real-life constraints 
confronted by the decision maker while maintaining the realism in the choice scenarios.  For 
example, a decision maker who may have only experienced projects of high financial risk, their 
self-reported scale would reveal a strong risk-aversion to the PPP model.  One of the advantages 
of the SC experiment is its ability to seek out the decision maker’s true risk preference by 
offering them a number of projects with different combinations of risks and rewards to choose 
from.  Another advantage is that making choices based on hypothetical scenarios does not 
impose burden on the respondent to recall experience from years ago therefore minimise 
hindsight or recall bias (cf., Anderson and Dekker, 2005). An advanced discrete choice model 
known as the latent class model (LCM) will be estimated to obtain the parameterised risk 
preferences; these will then be fed into RP data collected from the survey that eliciting 
participants’ real experience in the past specifically related to risk-allocation in PPP roads. 
The experiment adopts candidate attributes identified in Chung et al. (2010) as the basis of 
alternative packages of attributes that define the dimensions of PPP risk.  The paper’s findings 
on each party’s willingness and perceived ability to manage risks help us making sense of the 
derived indices.  The indices will become an important source of variables to test the ownership 
effect on choice of contract structures and on each sector’s view on accountability transfer.  The 
indices in themselves and the process of derivation represent a significant contribution in the 
contract literature.  We know of no other study that takes a similarly approach that integrates SC 
data and RP data to estimate the “true” risk preferences and studies how can they be influenced 
by incentive structures.   
In contrast to the common belief that contracts are entered into by a risk-neutral principal and a 
risk-averse agent to share risks, our study attests that both the principal and the agent are risk-
averse albeit at different magnitudes.  Our results contest the validity of findings that were based 
on the stereotype principal and agent.  Further, contrary to the theory of property rights that 
ownership right attenuates ex ante and ex post efficiencies, the present study argues that 
assignment of property rights offers the agent a protective shield against poor planning by the 
government principal in the meantime giving rise to ex ante opportunism.  The agent’s wary of 
exploiting ownership entitlements to their full extent distorts allocative efficiency in 
rationalising road space; and (3) compensation structure without the provision of revenue-
sharing acts as an disincentive for exerted non-revenue-enhancing performance effort.  These 
findings shed important light on the effectiveness of property rights on ex ante inefficiency 
because opportunism as an outcome of reverse-holdup (Wickelgren, 2007) can produce 
excessive ex ante private investments translating into project scope and design beyond the 
proposed project objective; the Sydney Cross City Tunnel (CCT) is a case in point.  Two 
aspects of ex post inefficiency surfaced.  First, the deployment of market force to manage public 
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goods is one of rationales that PPPs are being actively promoted, but the private sector agent’s 
reluctance to exercise ownership right for setting toll prices means that the PPP model fails to 
deploy market force to rationalise public road space.  Second, contracts are structured to 
incentivise risk-sharing amongst contracting parties, but the model that structured to reduce 
market risk for the agent by removing the revenue-sharing provision has produced the opposite 
effect in inducing the agent’s performance effort; this is a strong evidence of the contract failing 
to understand contracting party’s risk preference and reinforces the imperative of knowing the 
true preference.   
Further investigation discovers that this is not the failure of property rights per se but rather the 
objectives of implementation are in variant to risk-sharing that PPPs rationalise upon.  PPPs are 
primarily exploited as a financial means to ensure government budget certainty, consequentially 
PPPs are perceived as transferring accountability associated with ownership, although both 
parties are found to be averse to suggestions that ownership concession implies accountability 
transfer. 
The paper is organised in six sections.  Section 2 synthesises the theory of property rights as 
well as its resonance to PPPs with the aim of developing empirical predictions.  Section 3 
outlines the research method and underlines the theoretical significance of the LCM and the 
econometric properties of the model.  Section 4 provides the descriptive statistics.  Section 5 
details the process of deriving the risk indices named PPPRI, discusses the empirical 
considerations relating to the estimations and presents the results of hypothesis testing.  Section 
6 concludes with a summary of implications of the findings.   
2. Theory of property rights and public-private-
partnerships 
A contract is a set of mutually agreed promises under which parties make ex ante reciprocal 
commitments in terms of their ex post behaviour to coordinate (Brousseau and Glachant, 2002, 
p. 3; Brousseau, 2008, p. 37).  This interpretation is premised on two dimensions of contract: the 
multilateral agreements coordinated via a governance structure to reduce ex ante decision costs; 
and ex post behaviour conditioned on decision-making structures.   
The PPP model involves government contracting with a private sector proponent for a bundled 
product that comprises two distinct elements, the creation of an asset and the whole-of-life asset 
management (WWG, 2006).  During the concession term, the proponent is granted with the 
ownership right to design, build, finance and operate the asset for an agreed period of on 
average 60 years (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005).  The public sector, on the other hand, 
purchases a service instead of an asset, with pre-defined payment levels, which are payable only 
when the service meets required standards (Debande, 2002).  The payment mechanism or the 
compensation structure is linked to the requirements set out in the output specification and the 
results of the risk assessment (Akbiyikli et al., 2006), and comes with the conditions of 
penalising poor performance (English and Baxter, 2010).  The principal rationale of ownership 
entitlement and linking compensation with service outputs only is to incentivise the private 
proponent to implement ex ante efficient technology and innovations in project design and 
construction (Partnerships Victoria, 2000; HM Treasury, 2006; WWG, 2006) and to adopt a 
proactive management approach (Forward, 2006) in order to maximise ex post efficiency in 
service delivery over the long-term.   
The concept differs from other forms of private provision such as contracting out and 
privatisation in the dimensions of risks and rewards sharing and the greater private involvement 
in finance arrangements (Hodge, 2005).  The compensation structure varies depending on the 
transfer of demand risk associated with the project.  If the government bears the demand risk of 
the project, the financial compensation generally comes from state consolidated funds (English 
and Guthrie, 2003), to compensate the private proponent for the availability of the facility 
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(English, 2005a), and to pay for the service provision (English, 2006); no provision for revenue-
sharing between the principal and the agent is provided for.  This model is commonly known as 
the availability model (AM).  If the contract transfers out demand risk, user charges become the 
only source of financial compensation to the private proponent (English and Guthrie, 2003); to 
cap returns on private investments, revenue-sharing will be triggered when real return exceeds 
the threshold pre-determined based on the estimated return (Chung, 2009).  Regardless the 
funding channel, the financial compensation is the primary source of return to private capital.  
The private proponent may negotiate with the responsible public authority over a number of 
variables inherent in the procurement model, such as the term of concession, toll escalation 
options and traffic demand management measures (English, 2006) to ensure that the sales of the 
asset-based services are sufficient to discharge construction, financing, operation and 
maintenance costs plus a ‘reasonable’ profit for private investors (Duffield, 2001).   
The resonance of contract theory to PPPs is principally derived from the perspective of 
principal-agent relationship (Laffont and Tirole, 1991; Dewatripont and Legros, 2005); the 
perspective of  contract incompleteness (Schmidt, 1996; Hart, 2003; Bennett and Iossa, 2005); 
as well as the dimension of transaction costs (Parker and Hartley, 2003; Välilä, 2005; Jin and 
Doloi, 2008; Ricketts, 2009; Soliño and Gago de Santos, 2010).   
The debate on the matter of ownership to infrastructure delivery centres on the economic and 
behavioural perspectives of deploying private provision in public infrastructure delivery.  The 
economic perspective is mainly attributable to the dissatisfaction with the performance of state 
enterprises in the latter part of the twentieth century, with which grew a wave of reforms 
involving the reduction in direct state provision of goods and services across the world (Parker 
and Saal, 2003).  It was argued by protagonists like Shlefier (1998) and Schmidt (1996), that 
market contracts are preferred to state ownership for the production of public goods.  
Arguments in favour of the pricing mechanism presume that the market would have achieved 
higher productive efficiency relative to the state  (Meunier and Quinet, 2010).  The perplexity 
that the apparent failure of pricing mechanism coexisted with the growth in government 
regulation is, in Coase’s words, a phenomenon of the enforceability of property rights: “when 
[enforcement of property rights] is done...chaos disappears; and so does the government” (1959, 
p. 14) except that the necessary legal system to define property rights and to arbitrate disputes is 
not costless (Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1991).   In the pursuit of minimising ex post 
inefficiency, the step of formalising rules of the game to define property rights and to enforce 
contracts must be followed by a governance structure to institutionalise the play of the game 
(Williamson, 2000).  PPPs have become a predominant institutional structure to govern the play 
of the game between government authorities and private sector actors (Hodge and Greve, 2009).   
The behavioural perspective is related to the inevitably high uncertainty brought by the 
longevity of PPP contracts which would require an elaborated governance apparatus for these 
specific investments (Williamson, 1979, p. 254).  The idea of empowering concessionaires the 
ownership right attenuates ex post opportunistic hazard has been attested elsewhere (see 
Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997, for a comprehensive review).  PPPs deploy similar mechanisms 
for the purpose of facilitating risk-sharing across contracting parties by packaging the operations 
of the asset with the finance of the asset.  The empirical findings in Chung et al. (2010) have 
asserted that this package fosters efficiency by enabling the private owner greater flexibility to 
manage market and project risks, while the public sector procurer concentrates on other 
dimensions of risk that are best not left to the market.   
Structuring contracts to share risk in light of incentive problems is the central premise of 
contract theory (Ross, 1973; Holmström, 1979; Mirrlees, 1999).  From the ex ante aspects of 
contract, agreements to compensation structures are drawn up to facilitate risk-sharing and 
foster incentive alignment (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1986; Masten and Saussier, 2002);  and 
property rights are allocated to help distributing residual surplus between contracting parties, 
and to encourage parties’ incentives to invest (Brousseau and Glachant, 2002, p. 10); they are 
interpreted as efforts to overcome the incentive deficiencies of contracting traditions 
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(Williamson, 1985, p. 26).  Contracts are considered as devices structured ex ante to foster ex 
post efficiency, hence ex post institutions of contract must be supported by governance suitable 
for the dimensions of the underlying transaction  (Williamson, 1985, p. 29); since misalignment 
between transaction and governance structure is likely to associate with ex post performance 
problems (Anderson and Dekker, 2005). 
The behavioural assumptions are that economic actors are rationally bounded, have different 
preferences toward risk (Arrow, 1971), and display the propensity of shirking opportunism 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).   These behavioural attributes translate into agency problems of 
inefficiencies, which in the presence of information asymmetry between the principal and the 
agent, will give rise to ex ante inefficiencies known as adverse selection and ex post 
inefficiencies of moral hazard (cf., Holmström, 1979; Mirrlees, 1999).  Control of agency 
problems includes establishing incentives to align managerial behaviours with owner 
preferences and monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; also see Eisenhardt, 1989 for a 
review).  One of the well applied incentives in PPPs is risk transfer (Evenhuis and Vickerman, 
2010).  Transferring risks to the agent incentivises the agent to act in the interest of the 
government principal.  This principle of risk-transfer is to allocate the risk to the party that is 
least risk-averse to that risk; it is based on the assumption that contracting parties have different 
preferences toward different risks.  Transferring all risks out without considering the other 
party’s specific risk preferences would cost the government principal a sizeable risk premium 
that will outweigh the benefits of the partnership.  Thus, risk transfer needs to consider the 
degree of risk aversion of the agent.  The evidence that the risk allocation approach in PPPs was 
dominated by parties’ loss aversion (Arndt, 2000) suggests that a party who is willing to bear a 
specific risk, e.g., traffic risk, is supposed to have lower risk-aversion to the risk than the other 
party.   
 
Hypothesis 1:  Contracting parties of a PPP tollroad have different risk 
preferences toward different risks. 
 
Contract theory specifically cautions the tradeoff between risk-sharing and incentive provision 
because the principal and the agent do not share the same risk preference and the agent is more 
risk-averse than the principal.  One of the reasons being that the agent is unable to diversity their 
employment whereas the risk-neutral principal is capable of diversifying their investments 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 349).  This conjecture is even more likely to hold true in a 
relationship involving government, because government has in possession powerful means (e.g., 
the taxing power) of resource re-allocation.  The risk-sharing rationale in PPPs suggests that:  
 
Hypothesis 2:  In a PPP contractual relationship, the private sector agent is risk-
averse while the government principal is risk-neutral. 
 
If the above hypothesis is supported, the risk-averse agent would choose PPPPs from a menu of contracts 
due to the ownership right to residual claims: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  The risk-averse private sector agent would prefer PPPs to other 
procurement models. 
 
Complex transactions that are of long duration are featured with low describability ex ante 
because of uncertainty on future states.  In anticipation of large transaction costs of writing a 
comprehensive contract and the rigidity of court enforcement of written contract terms, parties 
to a relationship will rather settle with a contract that is incomplete (Klein, 1996).  Distribution 
of rights to capture ex post surplus is managed through the assignment of property rights – in 
Hart’s word: “[it is] incompleteness [that] opens the door to a theory of ownership” (1993, p. 
141).  Property rights empower the owner a bundle of ex post decision rights to i) act on 
uncontracted-for provisions and therefore greater incentive to invest ex ante (Grossman and 
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Hart, 1986); ii) protection against ex post expropriation on investments (Laffont and Tirole, 
1991); and iii) residual rights to insider information (Schmidt, 1996).  The behavioural 
assumption of bounded rationality which believes contractible variables are observable but not 
verifiable (Hart, 2002) necessitates the relevance of ex ante asset ownership (Hart, 1990).   
The enhanced incentive that comes with the ownership right to improve productive efficiency 
has become the principle argument for PPPs being superior to traditional public procurement 
methods (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005; Välilä, 2005).  Ownership becomes paramount in 
incomplete contracts because ex post decision rights give rise to greater efforts ex ante and 
bargaining power in non-contractible situations (Grossman and Hart, 1986).  This entitles the 
proprietor autonomous decisions to invest without the need for contract renegotiation thus 
savings on transaction costs.  Bundling asset construction and service provision under one 
ownership incites appropriate levels of productive investment, particularly so in areas like roads 
where the service provision can be well specified (Hart, 2003).  Bundling should lead to 
improved efficiency related to contract specification and future maintenance costs because it 
relaxes the rigid requirement to specify outputs that meet the ever-changing service quality in 
great detail with the embedded incentives to make careful planning over the long haul, and to 
invest efficiently at the outset to reduce maintenance cost over the asset’s life cycle.  The 
ownership bundling structure would have stronger incentive effect whenever the clarity of 
project objectives from the principal is in doubt.  This is often the case in procurements 
involving mega infrastructure projects as they have been in the past, captured by different 
portfolio ministers for their own gain (Chung et al., 2010).  Dewatripont and Legros (2005) has 
argued that transferring ownership to the agent could provide protection against risk of unclear 
project objectives by the government authority, their argument casts light on the private sector 
agent’s risk aversion to unclear project objectives.   
 
Hypothesis 4a Unclear project objectives will increase the private sector agent’s 
risk aversion. 
 
A further implication is that PPPs would shield the contractor from the risk of unclear project 
objectives by the government authority because ownership entitles them the freedom to adopt 
measures to manage uncontracted for events.  If the private sector agent dislikes risk of unclear 
project objectives, i.e., if Hypothesis 4a is supported, they would prefer the PPP procurement 
model. 
 
Hypothesis 4b The higher is the risk of unclear project objectives, the more 
preferred is the PPP model by the private sector agent. 
 
Ex post decision rights would entitle the proprietor the autonomy to control toll pricing to 
manage traffic travelling on their facility.  The price control right embedded in the ownership 
concession should reduce the private sector agent’s risk aversion.   
 
Hypothesis 5:  The right to toll pricing control will reduce the private sector 
agent’s risk aversion.   
 
We have argued in Chung et al. (2010), that governments were often seen to use private 
ownership to insulate themselves from risks related to politically sensitive matters such as direct 
exposure to public adverseness to toll pricing.  Such perception will mar the public acceptance 
of the PPP model and will render the model an unfavourable option to either side of the 
contract. 
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Hypothesis 6a: The public perception that ownership transfer is seen as to transfer 
ownership-related risk arising from public’s adverse attitude 
towards toll pricing will increase risk aversion of the private 
sector agent. 
 
 
Hypothesis 6b: The public perception that ownership transfer is seen as to transfer 
ownership-related risk arising from public’s adverse attitude 
towards toll pricing will increase risk aversion of the 
government principal. 
 
Coordination with the agent for non-contractible effort can be enhanced through revenue 
sharing (Holmstrom, 1982), in particular, the incentive scheme can encourage revenue-
enhancing effort (Atkinson et al., 1988; Gaynor and Gertler, 1995; Cachon and Lariviere, 2005).  
In a contractual relationship involving the government principal who is a social welfare 
maximiser, the revenue-enhancing outcome is replaced by the objective to supply the general 
public quality road service.  In this light, we expect that the revenue-sharing incentive will have 
little effect on the agent’s risk preference.  We expect that in the AM, the removal of revenue-
sharing from the contract will exert the agent’s effort in delivering quality service because the 
agent does not need to manage demand risk.  This proposition will hold up for a risk-averse 
agent, because under the AM in which the private sector agent does not partake in toll revenue-
sharing with the government principal, performance is evaluated against their service outputs 
meeting prescribed outcome rather than against usage demand which would expose the agent to 
demand fluctuations.   
Hypothesis 7:  The more risk-averse is the private sector agent, the more effective 
is the availability model to incentivise efficient performance 
during the operational phase.   
3. Research method 
The behavioural perspective of relevance in contracts between the parties is driven by questions 
of a discrete choice nature (Williamson, 1991; Sykuta, 2008).  Therefore, methods of collecting 
discrete choice data and in particular logit models used for analysing discrete choice data (cf., 
Hensher et al., 2005) will be considered as the primary form of research methodology in this 
study.  Within the PPP context, the key elements of the behavioural choice framework include 
the translation of the theoretical and conceptual contributions into an empirical setting capable 
of obtaining estimates of the role of identified risk dimensions for public and private sector 
stakeholders.  Inter alia is the development of an aggregate risk perception index linked to risk 
preferences that can assist in guiding ex ante contract design and its ex post evaluation, which 
we named the Public-Private-Partnership-Risk-Index or PPPRI.  Quantifying PPPRI requires 
identification of weights to attach to the underlying dimensions of risk associated with public 
and private sector stakeholders.  SC methods have been selected as the basis of designing choice 
experiments that can deliver the data required to study stakeholder choices amongst alternative 
packages of attributes that represent the dimensions of project risk.   
Choice analysis is about explaining variability in behavioural choice response amongst a set of 
considered or offered alternatives in a sampled population of individuals or other units of 
choice-making such as firms, community groups, etc.  The main task for the researcher is to 
capture the sources of behavioural variability at the individual decision-making level, which are 
initially unobserved by the researcher but assumed known with certainty by the decision maker.  
The challenge to the researcher is to capture as much as possible of the variability through a set 
of observed influences while finding ways of accommodating the remaining unobserved 
influences.  How to account for the latter and minimise the amount of unobserved heterogeneity 
is at the centre of choice analysis (Hensher et al., 2005).   
Property rights, right to efficiency? 
Chung, Hensher & Rose 
 
8 
To overcome these challenges will first require extensive inquiry to identify and compile 
“sources of influence”, i.e., attributes that matter to the decision maker.  The next step is to 
collect data on the identified attributes, which will be introduced into a functional form in order 
to establish their role in the identification of the level of utility contributed by that attribute to 
the overall level of utility associated with each alternative in a choice situation.  That is, a given 
alternative j faced by decision maker i can be expressed as a vector of attributes k as xijk, each 
component of which has a number of levels specified by the researcher either in absolute or 
relative (i.e., percentage deviation from a respondent-specified RP level) terms.   
The behavioural process assumes that each decision maker i acts as if he or she is a utility 
maximiser when choosing a most preferred alternative j in a choice situation.  Denoting the 
utility decision maker i derives from an alternative j as Uij, the utility maximisation exercise of 
the decision maker i can be expressed in its most basic form as: 
where βijk represents the vector of marginal utilities respondent i receives for each attribute x 
associated with the jth alternative.  That is, the task of the respondent is to choose one and only 
one alternative j; the alternative chosen is that which maximises his or her utility Uij that can be 
derived from a choice among the alternatives on offer.   
It is generally assumed that the researcher is only capable of observing a subset of the influences 
on the propensity of respondents to prefer a given alternative, and hence the resulting 
econometric model must specify Uij as a function of observed effects Vij and unobserved effects 
εij (cf., McFadden, 1974): 
 
where 
 
and ?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑘 represents the vector of estimated marginal utilities respondent i receives for each 
attribute x and alternative j. Any deviations of ?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑘 from the true values βijk are biased parameter 
estimates.  The application of appropriate econometric models within a discrete choice 
framework will minimise the information loss in the unobserved effects, allowing one to more 
closely approximate Uij with Vij. 
Since we know nothing about the unobserved component εij, it is necessary to make some 
assumptions about its distribution over the population.  The simplest starting point is that the set 
of unobserved components across different alternatives are independent (i.e., with no cross-
correlated terms so all covariances are equal to zero) with the exact same extreme type 1 (EV1) 
distribution1
Given the objective that the application of choice methods is to test whether the government 
principal and the private sector agent are heterogeneous in terms of their risk preferences, and to 
 such that the variances of different εij are identical for each alternative (i.e., 
identically distributed).  This set of assumptions is referred to as the IID condition – 
independently and identically distributed.  Imposing such strong assumptions is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition to derive the functional form for the utility expression of a multinominal 
logit model.  Where there is a concern about possible violation of the IID property, choice 
models that allow for less restrictive assumptions should be considered.   
                                                          
1 The phrase “extreme value” arises relative to the normal distribution.  The essential difference between the extreme type 1 and 
normal distributions is in the tails of the distribution where the extreme values reside (Hensher et al., 2005a, p. 84).   
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑘  ×  𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 
 
s.t. Uij > Uin for all j ≠ n 
 
(1) 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 =  𝑉𝑖𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗  (2) 
𝑉𝑖𝑗 =  ?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑘  × 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 (3) 
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derive the PPPRI, we will review the essential elements of an advanced choice modelling 
method – the latent class model (LCM) and discuss how the model can identify the critical risk 
dimensions influencing the preferences of each stakeholder.  Since the LCM is an extension of 
the most basic form of choice model, i.e., the multinominal logit (MNL) model, we will first 
examine the basic properties of the MNL model.  
3.1 Multinominal logit model 
The MNL model has for many years provided the fundamental platform for the analysis of 
discrete choice.  The derivation of this basic choice model can be found in Hensher et al. (2005, 
Chapter 3).  Generally, the imposed IID property makes it possible to gather unobserved 
influences associated with each alternative into a single unknown distribution, so the utility 
individual i receives from choosing alternative j can be collapsed into:  
 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 =  � 𝛽𝑘𝐾𝑗
𝑘=1
∙ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗 (4) 
 
The subscripts i and j attached to are removed because the model assumes that the preferences 
are the same across all individuals and across all choice situations in the MNL model. 
In choosing among alternatives, the decision maker compares the utility levels that they derive 
from each alternative within the choice situation on offer.  As the researcher does not have all 
the information the decision maker does, they can use only the sub-set of information they have 
managed to compile.  This is equivalent to saying that the researcher can explain an individual’s 
choice only up to a probability of an alternative being chosen.  The probability arises because 
the ij are a random distribution over the population.  The individual’s behavioural choice rule 
available to the researcher is as follows.  The probability of an individual choosing alternative j 
is equal to the probability that the utility of alternative j is greater than (or equal to) the utility 
associated with alternative n, i.e., Vij + ij ≥ Vin + in, which becomes Vij ≥ Vin + in – ij; 
after evaluating each and every alternative in the choice situation of n = 1,...j,...N alternatives.  
The researcher does not know what a specific person’s ‘location’ is on the error distribution; 
hence there is a probability distribution of this occurring given that ij and in are random 
variables. 
We assume the EV1 distribution of the random component ε in Equation (4.0) takes the 
following form: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜀𝑗 ≤  𝜀𝑛) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑒𝑥𝑝 −  𝜀) (5) 
 
The focus of Equation (5.0) is on the unobserved component of a utility expression for a specific 
alternative j; ε  represents draws from a random uniform.  The choice probabilities associated with each 
alternative, i.e., the logit probability formula of the MNL (Hensher et al. 2005):  
 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑗 =  exp𝑉𝑖𝑗 ∑ exp𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑛=1 ;  𝑛 = 1, … 𝑗, …𝑁 (6) 
Equation (6.0) states that the probability of an individual choosing alternative j out of the set of 
N alternatives is equal to the ratio of the (exponential of the) observed utility index for 
alternative j to the sum of the exponentials of the observed utility indices for all N alternatives, 
including the jth alternative.  Vij is equivalent to Vij defined in Equation (3.0). 
Although the MNL model represents the most widely used choice model to date, its maintained 
assumptions, e.g., IID, and homogeneity of preferences, are potentially limiting.  The MNL 
model assumes that preferences associated with each attribute are fixed across individuals; this 
assumption limits the model’s ability to handle preference heterogeneity, hence it is of little 
relevance to the research application in this study.  The restrictive assumptions of the MNL 
model have motivated our consideration for an advanced model, namely the LCM.   
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3.1.1 Latent class model 
The LCM is one of a number of choice model forms that have evolved in the literature to handle 
heterogeneity in preferences.  Its underlying theory posits that individual behaviour depends on 
observable attributes and on latent heterogeneity that varies with factors that are unobserved by 
the researcher (Greene and Hensher, 2003).  That is, it relaxes the preference homogeneity 
restriction imposed in the MNL model by facilitating membership of latent classes up to a 
probability.  In this way it engenders heterogeneity between classes.  The added advantage is its 
ability to identify the heterogeneity in discrete clusters across the sampled individuals without 
the extra burden on the researcher to make specific assumptions about the distributions of 
parameters across individuals.    
Preference heterogeneity is handled via discrete distributions in parameters.  These discrete 
distributions are referred to as ‘classes’.  According to the model, each individual resides up to a 
probability in a ‘latent’ class, Q.  In estimating the model, there exist a fixed number of classes, 
Q, where the number of classes is defined a priori by the researcher.  Estimates consist of the 
class specific parameters and for each respondent, a set of probabilities defined over the classes.  
Within each class, the parameters and choice probabilities are assumed to be generated by MNL 
models. 
The utility functions of the LCM differ to the MNL model in that there now exist several utility 
functions that require estimation.  Firstly, there exist the class specific utility functions which 
are represented as: 
 
𝑈𝑖𝑗|𝑞 =  𝑉𝑖𝑗|𝑞 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗|𝑞 (7) 
where i = individual,  j = alternative, q = class and εij|q ~ IID EV1.   
Individuals are implicitly placed into a set of Q classes up to a probability, but which class 
contains any particular individual, whether known or not to that individual, is unknown to the 
researcher.  Typically, the class assignment model is specified as an MNL model, which 
requires that an additional utility specification be defined.  These additional sets of utility 
functions are used to help distinguish individuals in terms of class membership.  We represent 
the class assignment model utility function as: 
 
𝑈𝑖𝑞 =  𝛿𝑞ℎ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑞 (8) 
where hi = represents a set of observable characteristics used to separate sampled individuals 
into different latent classes and δq associated parameters.   
For purposes of model identification, at least one class assignment (typically the last) utility 
function is normalised to zero.  If no utility function is directly specified by the researcher, then 
only class specific constants are used in the model to allocate individuals, up to a probability, 
into the different latent classes.  The characteristics contained in the hi vector must remain 
constant within each choice situation, and hence the class assignment model in effect assigns 
individuals and not choice situations to the different classes. 
The central behavioural model is defined as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑖𝑗|𝑞) =  exp 𝑉(𝑖𝑗|𝑞)
∑ exp 𝑉(𝑖𝑛|𝑞)𝑁𝑛=1 = 𝐹(𝑖, 𝑗|𝑞) (9) 
The above equation assumes heterogeneity and discrete distributions rather than continuous 
distributions in the parameters to be estimated. 
After identifying the relevant choice model form we now describe the process of deriving the 
PPPRI.   
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3.1.2 Public-private-partnership-risk-index 
The objective of the PPPRI is to obtain a single measure that quantifies stakeholder risk 
preferences over a wide range of issues.  It can be implemented at project level to establish a 
project-specific risk index, or at policy level to assess whether variations in policy variables 
(e.g., revenue-sharing, performance indicators, relaxation of pricing regulation etc.,) will change 
private investors’ risk-taking behaviour.  It can also be applied to different institutional 
environments to evaluate how institutional norms and public opinions affect the risk preferences 
of private investors and the preference for the PPP option by public sector authorities.   
We draw on the Hensher Service Quality Index (HSQI) (Hensher and Prioni, 2002; Hensher et 
al., 2003) as a way to establish such a set of risk indices pertinent to PPP tollroads.  The HSQI 
represents a set of quantitative performance indicators to measure bus service delivery quality 
and effectiveness.  Under this framework, the overall level of passenger satisfaction is measured 
by how an individual evaluates the total package of services offered.  The evaluation process 
involves the search for appropriate weights attached to each service dimension to identify the 
strength of positive and negative source of overall satisfaction.  To fulfil this objective, SC 
methods were used in the original study (Hensher and Prioni, 2002), whereby a sample of 
passengers were asked to choose their most preferred package from a number of alternative 
packages of service levels based on these attributes.  A number of logit models were estimated 
to establish the relative weights attached to the statistically significant attributes, representing 
the contribution of each service attribute to the calculation of an overall service quality index.  
In addition, the reference levels must be identified to apply the weights.  For this purpose, RP 
data of the perceptions of passengers relative to the levels of each attribute as experienced in a 
current trip were obtained; they were then multiplied by the relevant weight; summing these 
calculations across all attributes will produce the service quality index for each sampled 
passenger.   
Although HSQI was specifically designed for a different area of research to that currently under 
discussion in this study, it opens up an insightful avenue for the formulation of a risk index in 
the domain of PPPs.  To construct the risk index as an output of the estimation of the choice 
model using data from a SC experiment, we first need to identify the weights attached to each 
risk attribute, i.e., risk preferences, with the most likely source coming from SC data to 
parameterise the source of risks.  SC data are chosen over RP data because SC data provide 
greater flexibility to vary the levels of risk attributes so as to create a large number of scenarios 
within a systematic package of risk attributes in order to identify potential tradeoffs (Hensher, 
1994; Hensher et al., 1998).   
Nevertheless, RP data are an important input to determine the reference levels.  The preferred 
approach is to apply parameter estimates derived from data gathered by way of a SC experiment 
to the current RP levels which each participant in the sample currently experiences.  Once the 
data are collected, latent choice models will be estimated to establish the relative risk 
preferences.  The resulting utility indicators emanating from the estimation of models based on 
the SC experiment measure the expected utility that a stakeholder obtains from the average level 
of risk-allocation in recent contracts and how this might change under a variety of ownership-
related conditions as specified in the hypotheses.   
3.1.3 Survey design 
An internet-based survey is the most economical way to survey stakeholders internationally.  
Following the empirical testing structure developed in the last section, we designed a ‘computer 
assisted personal survey instrument’ (CAPI) which contains a SC experiment and a series of 
non-stated-choice questions that seek out information on the respondent’s experience with PPPs 
as well as their subjective views on the key factors influencing their choice of contract.  There 
are several distinct parts to the survey: (1) general questions capturing the socio-demographic 
covariates of respondents and other contextual effects; (2) choice menus corresponding to a 
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PPP-tollroad-concession setting;2
The SC experiment contains a number of decision choices based on hypothetical scenarios, in 
which a sample of individuals evaluates two unlabelled alternative contracts.  An unlabelled 
contract is one described by a bundle of attributes with no label or brand name to characterise 
what the alternative might be.  In contrast, a labelled experiment has a specific name attached to 
each of the alternatives in the experiment.  For example, in the “Instructions” screen in 
 (3) RP questions surveying respondents’ “prior experience” to 
determine the reference level for the derivation of the risk index; (4) attitudinal questions 
intended to obtain respondents’ preference for the PPP procurement model; and (5) questions 
intended to evaluate the extent to which other ownership-related variables and contractual 
conditions impact on respondents’ decisions to enter into a PPP contract.   
Figure 1, 
a labelled experiment will have “Sydney Harbour Tunnel” instead of “Contract A” and 
“Chicago Skyway” instead of “Contract B”.  The decision to use an unlabelled experiment 
rather than a labelled experiment has multiple advantages.  First, since this is an international 
study, an unlabelled experiment does not require the identification and use of all PPP tollroads 
in the world, representing significant savings in data collection cost and time.  Second and more 
importantly, because a project’s name acts somewhat like an alternative in a labelled 
experiment, a labelled experiment may invite unintended perceptions that respondents may hold 
with regard to that alternative to enter into their decision process, as well as induce the 
possibility that they will make inferences about attributes that are outside the focus of the study 
(i.e., that are not shown in the experiment) including assumptions based either on direct 
experience or second hand information as proxies for these additional attributes (Hensher et al., 
2005, pp. 112-114).   
Each contract (A or B) represents packages of attributes that are defined by levels of risk, and 
respondents are asked to indicate which package they believe would be preferred by the public 
sector and the private consortia.  The risk attributes are anchored to current experience 
described Chung et al. (2010), so that respondents can understand and relate to the attributes in 
a realistic way.  It is then important to create the other possible levels as reasonable variations 
on either side of current experience (Stopher, 1998).  Failure to do this may result in 
respondents providing poor quality and inappropriate responses, as they try to relate to attribute 
levels that are totally outside their experience and sometimes difficult to imagine.   
                                                          
2 We adopted the nine key risk attributes pertaining to PPP tollroads identified in Chung et al. (2010); these are: traffic risk, 
financial risk, network risk, force majeure, sovereign risk, risk of unclear project objectives, political and reputation risk, media risk 
and risk of public perceptions.   
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Figure 1:  The stated choice experiment – instructions screen 
In our design, three attributes were selected for each risk; downside risk (where the actual 
outcome of the risk is inferior to expectations at the contract’s financial close), risk neutrality 
(where the actual outcome of the risk is more or less meeting expectations at the contract’s 
financial close), and upside gain (where the actual outcome of the risk is superior to 
expectations at the contract’s financial close).  Attribute levels were presented in percentage 
terms to represent the degree of (un)certainty of a future eventuality (the three percentages sum 
to one for each risk).  Choice situations were assigned by a block column so that no contract 
will be presented more than once to the same respondent.  The attributes of risk (i.e., downside, 
neutral, upside) that are presented in columns are randomly rotated in order to minimise left-
hand-side bias.   
The choice experiment provides the variability needed to parameterise the source of risks.  
However, the reference point is needed to apply the model within the framework of PPPRI 
using the sentiment of HSQI.  In the screen shown in Figure 2, the respondents were asked to 
fill out the box of “downside risk” and the box of “upside gain” for each risk based on their past 
experience in terms of risks that experienced.  The percentage of the “risk neutral” attribute is 
automatically calculated after the data are entered into the other two boxes; the percentages 
across the three boxes sum to 100.  These RP data define the reference level for calculating 
PPPRI.   
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Figure 2:  The revealed preference data – prior experience 
The extensive literature on the choice of procurement between PPPs and other methods, 
discussed in Section 2, highlights an interest in attitudinal views of stakeholders.  We have 
designed a set of attitudinal questions to get a feeling about participants’ preference for the PPP 
procurement model.  In Figure 3, participants were asked to rate on a one to seven likert scale, 
whether they prefer PPPs over other methods (1=PPPs are the most preferred method; 7=other 
methods are the most preferred method or PPPs are the least preferred method).   
3.1.4 Data collection  
Individuals who have had direct experience in making decisions regarding PPP tollroad 
concessions were invited to take part in the experiment.  To mitigate the inhibiting effects of 
loss aversion bias, i.e., if decision makers expect that evaluation on the outcomes of their 
performance will take place after each choice situation, they become extremely loss-averse in 
terms of risk taking (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993), all participants were informed at the 
commencement of the experiment that they would be invited to assess five choice situations 
based on hypothetical scenarios which have been designed to mimic the risk profile of PPP 
tollroad contracts.  After the pilot study with eight participants, it was clear that the conciseness 
of the experiment required a detailed explanation to ensure consistent understanding across 
participants.  Therefore, a decision was made to adopt the CAPI approach to complete the 
collection process.   
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Figure 3:  Online survey – attitudinal questions (2) screen 
Semi-structured interviews were set up for the subsequent 93 participants.  Interviews lasted on 
average 100 minutes.  Most meetings were face-to-face, some were through skype, and two 
were by telephone, all undertaken by the author.  Since the choice situations were assigned by 
the blocking column and the order of attributes was randomly rotated, the author would have no 
knowledge what choice situations would come up unless the participant signed into the survey 
with their identification number.  Face-to-face and skype interviews have the advantage over the 
telephone interviews because these methods enable the author and the participant to share the 
exact information on the computer screen.  In the telephone interviews, the participant had to 
explain to the researcher what they saw on their computer screens.  Although time consuming, 
going through the survey with each participant has considerable empirical advantage.  It enabled 
the author to guide the participant throughout the whole experiment process and provide instant 
clarification when needed.   
At the beginning of the survey, participants were invited to give an account of their background 
and experience in the field.  These accounts were recorded on tape (with permission) to provide 
a means of assurance to cross reference the information filled out in the survey.  These 10-15 
minute initial conversations benefit the research in a number of ways; i) they help make sense of 
the perspectives of the participant (the information is then reflected in the first part of the 
experiment – “About You and the Projects You Have Been Involved In”, see Figure 4); ii) the 
information unveiled in the conversation also determines the role the participant will play in the 
experiments; and iii) they provide points for cross referencing with survey data when 
information is missing or unclear.     
With this background, we were able to understand each participant’s most recent experience or 
experience that they were most experienced in.   Given the number of years of experience in the 
field, many participants held multiple roles and worked for different organisations across the 
public and private sectors.  In order to obtain high quality data and minimise cross-over in their 
roles of play in the experiments, each participant was reminded during the survey to consistently 
play the role associated with their most recent experience or their most experienced role.  After 
finishing the first choice situation, the author asked the participant the reason for their decision, 
these questions being framed in accordance with the information the participant provided during 
the initial conversation.  As a way of illustration, the author asked a participant why would they 
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choose contract A given their background as the regulator.  The participant would then finish 
the remaining choice situations while the author sitting on the side observing their choices.  
When the participant chose a contract that was inconsistent with their previous choices and 
accounts, the author would clarify the reason of inconsistency without influencing/changing 
their choice.   
 
 
Figure 4:  Information of participant  
After six months of data collection and 101 interviews (eight pilots plus 93 post-pilot) with 
people who have had direct experience in dealing with PPP tollroad concessions, we have data 
capable of testing the set of hypotheses of interest.   
4. Descriptive statistics 
4.1 Demographic attributes 
Overall, the international significance of this study is enhanced by the coverage and diversity of 
the experience and knowledge of participants who took part in the survey.  The participants’ 
experience in PPP years (projects) runs the gamut of one to 46 years (one to 120 projects).  The 
participants have brought to this study their project experience in six regions covering 32 
countries.  One hundred and one people participated in the survey, of which 41 represent the 
public sector and 60 represent the private sector.  The distributions in Figure 5 and Figure 6 
show that the participating cohort represents a good spread in roles and organisations.  Their 
diverse background has strengthened the study’s global significance: there are 24 different roles 
represented, from “primary decision maker” to “consultant” that come from 14 different 
organisations, including steering committees and commercial banks.   
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Figure 5:  Distribution of roles - 101 participants Figure 6:  Distribution of organisations - 101 
participants 
Participants were asked to list the three most recent projects that they have been involved in.  As 
presented in Table 1, the locations of projects are diverse showing that PPP is an important and 
popular procurement method of road infrastructure across the world.  Private sector participants 
(PVSPs) were exposed to PPP projects in much more jurisdictions (166) than public sector 
participants (PUSPs) (110).  This evidence adds to the support for PPPs; some pundits have 
argued that PPPs offer government the opportunity to exploit economies of scale and scope by 
pooling knowledgeable resources abundantly available in the market (Parker and Hartley, 
2003). 
Figure 7 illustrates the tolling schemes that participants have been involved in.  Little less than 
half of the project experience (46.38 percent) applies fixed tolls, followed by 23.91 percent of 
project experience charging distance-based tolls and 9.06 percent charging an availability 
payment.  8.70 percent of project experience charge distance plus time-based variable tolls.  
Only one project applies High Occupancy Toll.  The “no new tolls” category accounts for two 
refinancing projects.  “OTHER” includes two projects that charge an availability payment plus a 
fixed toll; one started with a distance-based variable toll but has changed to an availability 
payment since 2003; one uses an availability payment plus 16 percent of shadow toll; and one in 
the US that applies a distance-based variable toll as well as a fixed toll.  Only three projects 
apply shadow toll, they account for 1.09 percent of total project experience.  The combination of 
shadow and availability payment regimes accounts for 2.54 percent of project experience, time-
based variable toll only represents 2.54 percent of total project experience. 
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Table 1:  Experience with tollroad projects (regions and countries) 
 
REGION COUNTRY REGION COUNTRY 
Africa (2 countries)  South Africa Europe 
(continued)  
France  
Mozambique Greece 
Asia-Pacific (9 
countries)  
  
  
  
  
Australia Hungry 
Bangladesh Ireland 
India Italy 
Indonesia Netherlands 
Korea Poland 
New Zealand Portugal 
Russia Spain 
Thailand UK 
Vietnam North 
America (3 
countries)   
Canada 
Caribbean (2 
countries) 
Jamaica Mexico 
Puerto Rico USA 
Europe (13 countries)  
  
Austria South 
America (3 
countries) 
Chile 
Belgium Brazil 
Croatia Colombia 
 Total  32 
 
 
 
Figure 7:  Involvement in tolling schemes 
 
  
Fixed toll
46.38%
Distance-based 
variable toll
23.91%
A
va
ila
bi
lit
y 
pa
ym
en
t
9.
06
%
Distance + time-
based variable toll
8.70%
OTHER
3.26%
Shadow toll/availability 
payment
2.54%
Time-based variable 
toll
2.54%
H
igh O
ccupancy T
oll
1.81%
shadow toll
1.09%
No new tolls
0.72%
Other
6.16%
Property rights, right to efficiency? 
Chung, Hensher & Rose 
 
19 
No systematic relationships are found between tolling scheme, types of project and the nature of 
project.  It appears that toll price is primarily used to pay for the project rather than being 
implemented as a traffic demand management device.  This observation highlights the potential 
failure of PPPs to fully exploit the market for allocative efficiency in managing road space.  
Interview data reveal that PPPs were perceived, by both sector participants, as primarily a 
financing instrument under which the benefit of PPPs, i.e., bringing in market discipline to 
regulate demand and supply for road space, may not have been exploited to its fullest.  Such 
failure is not the failure of PPP per se but rather the exploitation of market is being obscured by 
political intent to bypass fiscal constraint.  A retired director of a road authority succinctly 
pinpointed the problem:  
Pa:  To get the best outcome for the community each party should bear 
the risk that is in their position to do so.  Unfortunately this is not 
happening in reality.  Financing cost, tolls, and length of the 
concession are more than they should be.  These were set in the view 
of not adding public debt.   
He was joined by others: 
Pb:  Design, Build, Operate & Maintain [model] brings all the benefits 
of a PPP without having major transaction costs + high risk profile 
- the only major benefit [of PPPs] is having finance that State 
Governments do not want to borrow or go into debt.   
 
Pc:  [PPP] is a function of western democracies needing to use stretched 
balance sheets to provide services that cannot be funded by the 
private sector e.g., police, hospital and health services and school 
services.  
 
Pd:  Currently, due to restrictions in public budget, one could tend to 
overestimate the benefits of PPP. 
Some went further on the myopic view of politics which may have compromised the social 
benefits of PPPs: 
Pe:  30-year concession period leads to big efficiency savings, [as long 
as it can] avoid political interference (e.g., refusing to increase 
tolls). 
 
Pf:  There should however be opportunities [in contracts] for using 
pricing mechanisms to manage the network (i.e. tolls not linked to 
CPI). 
Most PUSPs who acted in the capacity of regulator admitted that toll pricing is a sensitive 
matter and therefore its level and escalation clause must be closely regulated by government.  
Many PPP road contracts impose strong clauses to limit the private operator’s capacity to set 
and vary toll pricing.  Figure 8 shows that only 13 percent of project experience applies, to some 
extent, the pricing structure (e.g., time variable, high occupancy toll) that is linked to traffic 
demand management compared to an 87 percent share of other tolling schemes.   
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Figure 8:  Tolling scheme – traffic management vs. others 
4.2 Contract choice 
In each of the five choice situations in the SC experiment, participants were asked to consider 
contract A and contract B and based on each contract’s risk profile, to indicate which contract 
they think a private consortia would prefer (“1st row” in Figure 9) and the contract they believe 
a public agency would prefer (“2nd row” in Figure 9).  In more than half (57 percent or 290 
cases) of the 505 choice situations, respondents believed that both parties would prefer the same 
contract; of which an overwhelming 57 percent (165 cases) of respondents are PVSPs.  It 
suggests that PVSPs are comparatively more confident about reaching an agreement with the 
road authority.   The confidence may be accumulated over their greater exposure to the number 
of projects and exposure to a greater number of countries.   
 
 
Figure 9:  The stated choice experiment – contract choice 
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After choosing the preferred contract, respondents were asked whether they would accept the 
contract they prefer if it actually existed (“3rd row” in Figure 9).  In 54 percent of 505 cases, 
respondents indicated that they would accept the preferred contract, of which 60 percent of 
respondents came from the private sector.  Evidently, most PUSPs favour inaction.  This status 
quo bias implies that when making decision about whether or not entering into a procurement 
contract, PUSPs are highly loss-averse therefore prefer avoidance of risks (Kahneman et al., 
1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991).  Similar observation was explained in Tetlock and 
Boettger (1994) that pressures of accountability increase the status quo bias and other 
manifestations of loss aversion.   
The average value of the extent that each individual participant thinks that the other party would 
accept the contract they prefer (“4th row” in Figure 9) is 55.28 percent.  The average of PUSPs 
(55.50 percent) is very close to that of the PVSPs (55.13 percent).  However, PVSPs (66.67 
percent) are more likely to believe that the public sector party would definitely (not) accept the 
contract they prefer.  That shows that the PVSPs are more optimistic in terms of reaching a deal 
with public authorities.  Interview data confirm that many PVSPs consider that they are willing 
to take on any risk as long as they will be adequately compensated for.     
4.3 Prior experience  
Following the choice situations, participants were presented the opportunity to tell us about their 
real experience in terms of risk borne (refer to Figure 2).  Table 2 contrasts the mean value of 
PUSPs and that of PVSPs for each risk attribute.  The contrast shows that participants have 
experienced inequitable risk-sharing.  The PVSPs have mostly borne downside risks associated 
with traffic volume and financial return and their shares of the related upside gain are far less 
than the losses they have suffered.  Such outcomes are consistent with the risk allocation 
paradigm in PPP real toll programs, i.e., tolls are directly charged on users, in which the private 
sector is primarily responsible for these risks (Chung, 2009).  Downside risk of unclear project 
objectives appears to have much worse impact on PUSPs (33.24 percent) relative to PVSPs 
(18.60 percent).  The higher mean values associated with PUSPs for downside risks of social 
dimension such as political and reputational, media and public perceptions suggest these risks 
mainly rest with the public sector.    
4.4 Prefer procurement method 
On average, PUSPs – having a mean value of 3.49 compared with PVSPs’ mean value of 2.37 – 
appear to be more in favour of PPPs over other methods.  But Figure 10 shows that there is a 
much higher proportion of PVSPs who prefer PPPs (71.67 percent in ratings 1 and 2 combined) 
than the PUSP counterparts (24.39 percent in ratings 1 and 2 combined).  The rating is related to 
any PPP project, not just tollroads.  Many respondents held the view that the choice of 
procurement method should depend on the project, its characteristics, and the availability of 
government funding.   
4.5 Other factors 
We acknowledge that in addition to risks pertinent to PPP tollroads, there are a number of 
considerations that may influence stakeholder decisions on entering into a contract; the related 
data were collected through the screen depicted in Figure 11.  At the time of survey design, the 
world was experiencing a significant economic downturn caused by the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC).  Particularly, the crisis highly impacted on lender’s ability and willingness to invest.  
Further, during the pilot study, it was drawn to our attention that the AM and land acquisition 
responsibility are two important considerations in countries outside Australia.  The addition of 
these two variables in our factor list has enhanced the relevance of the study to the international 
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community.  The mean values3 Table 3 reported in  show that both PUSPs and PVSPs share 
similar views on the importance of these factors. 
Table 2:  Prior experience of risk borne (contrast of mean) 
  PUSPs PVSPs  Difference in Mean 
  Mean (%) Mean (%) PUSPs – PVSPs (%) 
Traffic_downside risk (TRA_D) 14.15 54.07 -39.92 
Traffic_upside gain (TRA_U) 11.37 17.38 -6.02 
Financial_downside risk (FIN_D) 13.41 45.47 -32.05 
Financial_upside gain (FIN_U) 15.20 22.30 -7.10 
Network_downside risk (NET_D) 19.32 22.78 -3.47 
Network_upside gain (NET_U) 21.15 31.50 -10.35 
Force majeure_downside risk (FOR_D) 21.88 14.57 7.31 
Force majeure_upside gain (FOR_U) 5.98 8.12 -2.14 
Sovereign_downside risk (SOV_D) 23.90 17.40 6.50 
Sovereign_upside gain (SOV_U) 7.93 9.63 -1.71 
Unclear project objectives_downside risk (UNC_D) 33.24 18.60 14.64 
Unclear project objectives_upside gain (UNC_U) 12.20 16.43 -4.24 
Political and reputational_downside risk (POL_D) 39.20 21.87 17.33 
Political and reputational_upside gain (POL_U) 13.41 21.03 -7.62 
Media_downside risk (MED_D) 41.17 25.13 16.04 
Media_upside gain (MED_U) 13.10 18.05 -4.95 
Public perception_downside risk (PUB_D) 45.37 27.63 17.73 
Public perception_upside gain (PUB_U) 12.68 20.57 -7.88 
 
(1=PPP the most preferred model, 7=PPP the least preferred model) 
 
Figure 10:  Prefer procurement method – PUSPs vs. PVSPs 
 
 
                                                          
3 The data were collected through a 1-to-7 likert scale.  1 indicates that the factor is very unimportant whereas 7 indicates that the 
factor is very important. 
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Figure 11:  Other factors of influence 
 
Table 3:  Other factors – PUSPs vs. PVSPs 
 PUSPs 
(mean) 
PVSPs 
(mean) 
Global financial crisis (GFC) 5.51 5.83 
Future growth of private provision in transport infrastructure (FGROWTH) 5.12 5.62 
Freedom of the private operator to set toll pricing (FREETOLL) 3.07 4.05 
Duration of the tollroad concession (DURATION) 4.59 5.05 
Performance standards embedded in the tollroad concession (PERSDR) 5.90 5.47 
Financial penalties imposed on failing to meet performance standards (FPENALTY) 5.44 5.03 
Private ownership to help government keeping work force at arms-length (PVOWNW) 3.10 4.18 
Private ownership as a way of making it easier to charging users a toll (PVOWNT) 3.15 3.58 
Proper toll pricing to manage traffic demand (TPRICETD) 5.83 5.32 
The sharing of toll revenue with the other party (TRSHARE)) 4.17 4.05 
The availability model to incentivise efficient performance during the operational phase 
(AM) 
4.75 4.00 
Land acquisition risk is borne by government (LAND) 5.63 5.50 
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SC data collected through the five choice situations allow for the estimation of a rich set of 
parameter estimates in establishing weights associated with each risk attributes.  We estimated a 
LCM jointly by pooling both segments of data, i.e., PUSPs and PVSPs.  In the model, we 
specified two classes.4 Table 4  The results are presented in .  
Table 4:  Parameter estimates of latent class model 
Parameters of Alternative Specific Attributes:   
Public Sector 
 
Parameters of Alternative Specific Attributes: 
Private Sector 
Class 1 Class 2  
 
Class 1 Class 2 
 (p = 0.00) (p = 0.00)  
 
(p = 0.00) (p = 0.00) 
TRA_D1 -0.03700 (-2.59) -0.08007 (-1.87)  TRA_D2 -0.17224 (-3.97) -0.1157 (-3.13) 
TRA_U1 0.00862 (0.80) -0.09079 (-2.05)  TRA_U2 0.04848 (2.69) -0.03383 (-1.95) 
FIN_D1 -0.02462 (-1.99) -0.06314 (-1.65)  FIN_D2 -0.18267 (-3.83) -0.07313 (-2.93) 
FIN_U1 -0.00078 (-0.07) -0.09455 (-2.15)  FIN_U2 0.05950 (2.81) -0.03439 (-2.23) 
NET_D1 0.00539 (0.52) -0.07872 (-1.70)  NET_D2 -0.15676 (-3.89) 0.02921 (1.81) 
NET_U1 0.02230 (2.14) -0.06979 (-1.62)  NET_U2 -0.06101 (-2.69) 0.02742 (1.53) 
FOR_D1 -0.00379 (-0.34) -0.07886 (-1.98)  FOR_D2 -0.06129 (-2.78) -0.01539 (-0.77) 
FOR_U1 0.00131 (0.13) -0.01321 (-0.51)  FOR_U2 -0.03688 (-2.02) -0.01812 (-0.97) 
SOV_D1 0.03265 (1.73) -0.12031 (-2.14)  SOV_D2 -0.03380 (-1.66) -0.13908 (-3.42) 
SOV_U1 0.02290 (1.86) -0.1402 (-2.15)  SOV_U2 0.04036 (1.97) -0.0773 (-3.08) 
UNC_D1 -0.01941 (-1.74) -0.05915 (-1.65)  UNC_D2 0.01615 (0.99) -0.01368 (-0.76) 
UNC_U1 -0.00632 (-0.60) 0.02399 (0.93)  UNC_U2 0.04990 (2.80) -0.0107 (-0.65) 
POL_D1 -0.04100 (-3.60) 0.00841 (0.30)  POL_D2 -0.01158 (-0.76) -0.01785 (-0.98) 
POL_U1 0.00310 (0.35) 0.12581 (2.09)  POL_U2 0.00838 (0.52) -0.02235 (-1.26) 
MED_D1 -0.29084E-04 (0.00) -0.00323 (-0.06)  MED_D2 -0.03468 (-2.21) -0.01337 (-0.81) 
MED_U1 0.02143 (1.97) 0.00192 (0.04)  MED_U2 -0.00887 (-0.40) 0.00419 (0.32) 
PUB_D1 -0.02684 (-2.28) -0.06366 (-1.71)  PUB_D2 -0.06199 (-2.26) -0.07312 (-2.28) 
PUB_U1 0.00900 (0.82) -0.06204 (-1.48)  PUB_U2 -0.11907 (-3.33) -0.00715 (-0.45) 
 
  
 
 
 
    
 
 
Model fit 
 
 
 
 
    
 
AIC 
  
499.140   
    
 
Log-Likelihood -176.570 
 
 
    
 
 
1010 No. Of observations: 
 
 
    
 
 
Note:  
 
1) t values are in brackets;   
2) nnnnn.E-xx or E+xx => multiply by 10 to -xx or +xx; and 
3) Acronyms: XXX_D = downside risk; XXX_U = upside gain; 1 = public sector; 2 = private sector; TRA = traffic risk;  
FIN = financial risk; NET = network risk; FOR = force majeure; SOV = sovereign risk; UNC = risk of unclear project objectives;  
POL = political risk; MED = media risk; and PUB = risk of public perception. 
  
 
The PPRI is calculated by the application of the utility expression in Equation (2.0), and the 
actual levels of risk allocation that each sampled stakeholder has experienced, captured by the 
RP data input for “prior experience”.  After the weights are identified using the LCM, we 
multiply each attribute level associated with the prior experience by the relevant weight and sum 
these calculations across all attributes to produce the sector-specific risk indices.  
All participants except one PUSPs who displays risk neutrality are risk-averse.  The values of 
risk indices associated with PUSPs (PUBRI) are in the range -18.53 percent and zero percent 
with a mean value of -7.26 percent; the range of risk indices associated with PVSPs (PRVRI) 
lies between -56.98 percent and -3.47 percent with a mean value of -23.15 percent.  For easy 
                                                          
4 Changes in classes did not improve model fit nor did it increase numbers of significant parameters.   
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interpretation, we will standardise these indices into the positive range.  These index values are 
the important source of information for hypothesis testing.   
To test Hypothesis 1 using the parameter estimates of the LCM, we need to convert each risk 
attribute from two classes, i.e., 𝛽𝑘|𝑞1 and 𝛽𝑘|𝑞2, into a single 𝛽𝑘 , and applied the Krinsky and 
Robb (1986) procedure to generate confidence intervals (CIs) for 𝛽𝑘𝑃𝑈𝑆𝑃𝑠 and 𝛽𝑘𝑃𝑉𝑆𝑃𝑠   in order 
to test the following relationship: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  𝜷𝒌𝑷𝑼𝑺𝑷𝒔 ≠ 𝜷𝒌𝑷𝑽𝑺𝑷𝒔 
 
We report the mean value as well as the CIs, i.e., upper bound of 97.5 percentiles and lower 
bound of 2.5 percentiles of each risk attribute in Table 5.  The table shows that 94 percent or 17 
out of 18 parameter estimates associated with PVSPs are significant (the only insignificant 
parameter is POL_U2), but only 44 percent or eight out of 18 parameter estimates associated 
with PUSPs are significant (the eight significant parameters are TRA_D1, FIN_D1, UNC_U1, 
POL_D1, POL_U1, MED_D1, MED_U1 and PUB_D1).  Eighty percent or 20 out of 25 
significant parameter estimates (PVSPs and PUSPs combined) are of the expected sign, i.e., 
downside risks have the negative sign and upside gains have the positive sign.  The significant 
parameters of unexpected signs are all associated with PVSPs.  Possible explanations of these 
incorrect signed parameters are as follows. 
A possible explanation with regards to NET_U2 (negative), which is expected to be positive, is 
that the perceived upside gain from network redevelopment around the private toll facility 
signals that the public would view the project as a vehicle to transfer user costs to private gains.  
As the Sydney CCT experience entails, such perception has generated significantly unwelcome 
repercussion to the PPP scheme.  This reason may explain PVSPs’ aversion to the upside 
attribute.   
The FOR_U2 parameter is also negative when it is expected to be positive.  One possible 
explanation of this is that during the survey, participants informed the author that they did not 
believe the risk of force majeure will have upside gain and none of them have experienced 
upside benefit of this category; their disbelief may have resulted in the unexpected sign 
associated with FOR_U2.   
In terms of the unexpected positive sign of the parameter estimate associated with UNC_D2, we 
have hypothesised that ownership transfer in PPPs shields the private sector agent from this risk 
from the government principal which implicates that the agent dislikes the risk therefore the 
parameter should have a negative sign.  Empirically, a number of PVSPs revealed to the author 
during the experiment that unclear project objectives by the public sector have in the past 
provided them with greater opportunities to exercise their own discretion in terms of project 
scope and delivery.  This outcome is consistent with the problem of opportunism identified by 
Coase and Williamson in that complex and long-term contracts come with difficulties to 
precision provisions to curtail opportunism; we will further confirm this when testing 
Hypothesis 4b.  
With regards to the MED_U2 and PUB_U2 which are both negative, their significance indicates 
that PVSPs acknowledge that media and the public are important factors influencing the success 
of their projects.  The negative sign of MED_U2 may be justified on the grounds that PVSPs 
prefer less public exposure because open appraisal of project success may encourage new 
entrants therefore increase competition.   
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Table 5:  Risk attributes – post Krinksy and Robb procedure 
PUSPs 
𝛽𝑘𝑃𝑈𝑆𝑃𝑠  
PVSPs 
mean Lower Upper 𝛽𝑘𝑃𝑉𝑆𝑃𝑠  mean Lower Upper 
TRA_D1 -0.03828 -0.05093 -0.02602 TRA_D2 -0.13318 -0.15205 -0.11426 
TRA_U1 -0.00749 -0.02422 0.00861 TRA_U2 0.02798 0.02092 0.03485 
FIN_D1 -0.02294 -0.03693 -0.00940 FIN_D2 -0.12545 -0.14448 -0.10621 
FIN_U1 -0.01189 -0.03154 0.00695 FIN_U2 0.03750 0.02812 0.04675 
NET_D1 -0.00358 -0.02213 0.01394 NET_D2 -0.08368 -0.09313 -0.07394 
NET_U1 0.01192 -0.00787 0.03069 NET_U2 -0.01783 -0.03033 -0.00521 
FOR_D1 -0.00863 -0.02819 0.00997 FOR_D2 -0.03298 -0.04506 -0.02105 
FOR_U1 0.00949 -0.00294 0.02144 FOR_U2 -0.01623 -0.02978 -0.00285 
SOV_D1 0.00668 -0.01791 0.02994 SOV_D2 -0.05570 -0.06883 -0.04316 
SOV_U1 -0.00200 -0.03087 0.02531 SOV_U2 0.01211 0.00101 0.02298 
UNC_D1 -0.01441 -0.03192 0.00211 UNC_D2 0.01510 0.00648 0.02355 
UNC_U1 0.01309 0.00444 0.02148 UNC_U2 0.04047 0.02990 0.05076 
POL_D1 -0.02153 -0.02409 -0.01883 POL_D2 -0.01261 -0.01364 -0.01176 
POL_U1 0.03126 0.01979 0.04402 POL_U2 0.01113 -0.00140 0.02369 
MED_D1 -0.00233 -0.00327 -0.00115 MED_D2 -0.02611 -0.02739 -0.02461 
MED_U1 0.01415 0.01389 0.01475 MED_U2 -0.00783 -0.01127 -0.00460 
PUB_D1 -0.02720 -0.03871 -0.01603 PUB_D2 -0.04124 -0.06454 -0.01799 
PUB_U1 -0.00220 -0.01445 0.00963 PUB_U2 -0.06015 -0.08004 -0.03977 
Note: Values in bold text are statistically significant estimates across both data segments, italicised values are statistically 
in
The results depicted in 
significant estimates for at least one segment. 
Figure 12 were generated using the estimated CIs.  The figure plots the 
parameter estimates that are significant for both cohorts, which are highlighted in bold in Table 
5, to illustrate whether the CIs overlap (overlapping means that the parameters are not 
significantly different across the two sectors).  The figure shows that six out of seven significant 
risk preferences associated with PUSPs are significantly different from their PVSPs 
counterparts at the 95 percent level, i.e., the 95 percent CIs of the two data segments do not 
cross.  Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported with respect to TRA_D, FIN_D, UNC_U, POL_D, 
MED_D and MED_U.  The implications of such results are as follows.   
4.5.1 Traffic risk downside (TRA_D) 
Both sector participants are averse to the risk, but they are significantly different in terms of 
their degree of risk aversion.  The mean values of TRA_D1=-0.03828 and TRA_D2=-0.13318 
suggest that PVSPs are 3.5 times more averse to the risk than PUSPs.    
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Figure 12:  Confidence intervals – test of risk preferences (PUSPs vs. PVSPs) 
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4.5.2 Financial risk downside (FIN_D) 
The mean values of FIN_D1=-0.02294 and FIN_D2=-0.12545 suggest that PVSPs are 
overwhelmingly (5.5 times) more averse to financial downside risk compared with PUSPs.  An 
inspection of Figure 12 reveals that the largest difference between the two cohorts lies with this 
category.  This is not a surprising result.  It is consistent with our descriptive analysis that PPPs 
are essentially a means of project finance and financial risk is one of the risks that governments 
want to divest the most therefore exposing private capitals to a great deal of risk.    
4.5.3 Unclear project objectives upside (UNC_U) 
The mean values of  UNC_U1=0.01309 and UNC_U2=0.04047 mean that PVSPs are 3.1 times 
more in favour of well-defined projects compared with PUSPs.  This finding sends a strong 
message to public procurers.  Projects with good planning and clear objectives entail that they 
will come with a well thought-out risk allocation strategy to facility the fulfilment of policy 
goals.  A favourable perception from PVSPs suggests that such projects can drive risk premium 
down; so clear project objectives are a key driver for value for money.   
4.5.4 Political and reputational risk downside (POL_D) 
The difference between POL_D1=-0.02153 and POL_D2=-0.01261 arises as the result of 
PUSPs being almost twice more averse to the risk than PVSPs.  This finding reinforces our 
conclusion drawn in Chung et al. (2010) that the public sector has in the past suffered greater 
repercussion from political backlash due to the controversial of the PPP scheme.  It signals to 
the private sector that if they wish governments continuously open opportunities to the market, 
they should help strengthening the scheme’s public image.  Since the private sector plays a 
significant part in project delivery and operations, the scheme’s welcomeness, to a large extent, 
can be enhanced through their ongoing dialogues with users and with the community.   
4.5.5 Media risk downside (MED_D) 
The difference in risk preference towards media risk (mean values of MED_D1=-
0.00233 and MED_D2=-0.02611) is due to PVSPs having a greater aversion to the risk 
(11 times greater) in comparison with PUSPs.  This is quite the opposite to the RP data 
collected via “prior experience” presented in Table 2 in which PUSPs appear to be 16 
times more averse to the risk than PVSPs.  This conflicting evidence strongly suggests 
that behavioural perceptions can be quite different from real experience.   
4.5.6 Media risk upside (MED_U) 
The difference (mean values of MED_U1=0.01415 and MED_U2=-0.00783) suggests that 
PVSPs are 1.6 times more averse to media appraisal compare with PUSPs.  The reason is 
similar to the explanation given above that greater appraisal of project success may increase 
competition.  The result that PUSPs are in favour of media’s support is consistent with their 
aversion to POL_D as positive media exposure helps strengthening the public sector’s image.  
We perform two t-tests to examine Hypothesis 2 in order to understand whether parties to a PPP 
concession are of the stereotype as described in contract theory, i.e., the agent is risk-averse 
whereas the principal is risk-neutral.   
 
Hypothesis 2:   𝒙�𝑷𝑹𝑽𝑹𝑰 < 0,𝒙�𝑷𝑼𝑩𝑹𝑰 = 𝟎 
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We graphed the derived PUBRI and PRVRI in Figure 13, in which the indices are normalised to 
a base of zero for the participant with the highest relative index in each sector respectively, so 
all indices are now standardised into the positive range.5
Figure 13
  The contrast of these two indices 
shown in  clearly illustrates that both indices are in the positive range, i.e., both the 
principal and the agent are risk-averse.  The private sector agents are on average much more 
risk-averse than the public authority principals; the average risk index of the agent (23.15 
percent) is more than three times of the average value of the principal (7.26 percent).  The one-
tailed t-test in Equation (10.0) asserts that the average of PRVRI is negative, i.e., the private 
sector agent is risk averse; but the two-tailed t-test in Equation (11.0) strongly rejects that the 
government principal is risk-neutral.  Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is not supported because the 
government principal is found to be risk-averse, i.e., the stereotype principal in contract theory 
does not hold up in the ownership concession model. 
 
 
Figure 13:  Risk index – PUBRI versus PRVRI 
𝑡𝑖 =  ?̅?𝑃𝑅𝑉𝑅𝐼 −  0𝑠
√𝑛
= 23.15 − 00.1188
√60 =  15.10 > 2.575 (10) 
 
𝑡𝑖 =  ?̅?𝑃𝑈𝐵𝑅𝐼 −  0𝑠
√𝑛
= 7.26 − 00.04550
√41 =   10.21 > 2.575 
(11) 
Two reasons contribute to the profound difference between PUBRI and PRVRI.  We have 
demonstrated in the LCM and the testing of Hypothesis 1 that PUSPs and PVSPs have different 
preferences toward different risks.  Furthermore, the analysis of RP data on “prior experience” 
shown in Table 2 has confirmed that the experience of the two segments is also profoundly 
different from each other.  It is logical that feeding the parameter estimates from the LCM 
which clearly show that risk preferences of the two segments are different into different RP 
levels will produce significantly different risk indices.  Nevertheless, this outcome provides us 
with the necessary condition for our investigation into how would the past experience influence 
the private agent’s choice of contract and how would this experience shape up their attitude 
towards property rights embedded in the ownership. 
                                                          
5 From this point onward, all analysis will be based on normalised indices, i.e., risk aversion indices are presented in positive 
values; higher value means greater risk aversion.   
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We have argued that if Hypothesis 2 with regards to the risk-averse agent is supported, the agent 
would choose PPPPs from a menu of contracts due to the ownership benefit to residual claims.  
Participants’ choices of procurement method, as described in Section 4, are presented in an 
ordered outcome scale of seven levels.  Testing a hypothesis that has an ordered scale as 
dependent variable requires an ordered response model that recognises the nonlinearity of a 
ranking scale and defines points on the observed rating scale as thresholds.  The ordered logit 
model allows one to include ordinal dependent variables into the outcome model in a way that 
explicitly recognises their ordinarily and avoids arbitrary assumptions about their scale.  The 
essence of the approach is an assumed probability distribution of the continuous variable that 
underlies the observed ordinal dependent variable (Jones and Hensher, 2004).  In specifying an 
appropriate model, we assume that the seven-point ranking scale is a monotonic transformation 
of an unobserved interval variable.  Thus, one or more values of an interval-level variable are 
mapped into the same value of a transformed ordinal variable.  An underlying continuous 
variable is mapped into categories that are ordered but are separated by unknown distances.  We 
cannot, for example, say that the difference between ranks 1-2 is identical to the difference 
between 2 and 3.  Estimates can be obtained for both the parameters associated with each of the 
independent variables (one, i.e., PRVRI, only in Hypothesis 3), and the threshold parameters.  
The threshold parameters indicate the extent to which the categories of the ranking scale are 
equally spaced in the logit scale.  They are essentially constants that redefine the utility scale 
across the set of outcomes to recognise that the utility scale is nonlinear between outcomes.  We 
applied the following ordered logit form using the derived risk index to test Hypothesis 3: 
 
Hypothesis 3:   Choice of PPP = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 ∙ 𝑷𝑹𝑽𝑹𝑰 
 
 
To estimate an ordered logit model in NLogit 4.0, model specification must include a constant term, one, 
as the first right hand side variable.  Since the equation does include a constant term, one of the threshold 
parameters (µs) is not identified, so µ0 is normalised to 1.  The dependent variable is coded 0, 1, 2, ..., N, 
and there must be at least three values.  We converted the one-to-seven likert scale into a scale of zero-to-
six.  The results of testing Hypothesis 3 using NLogit 4.0 are reported in Table 6. 
 
A direct interpretation of the parameter estimates in Table 6 is not possible given the logit transformation 
of the outcome dependent variable required for model estimation.  We therefore provide in the table the 
marginal effects of the two end scales, i.e., Y=0 (PPP is the most preferred method) and Y=6 (PPP is the 
least preferred method), defined as the derivatives of the probabilities, to explain the influence a one unit 
change in an independent variable, i.e., risk aversion, has on the probability of selecting a particular 
outcome, i.e., choice of procurement method, ceteris paribus.       
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Table 6:  PPP model versus PRVRI 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable  Parameter t-value Hypothesis Support  
 
Model 
              
Choice of 
PPP 
Procurement 
model  
Constant  -0.00114 (-0.01) 3 NO Ordered 
logit PRVRI  2.41940 (3.77) 
 
  
Threshold parameters   
  
 
 
µ (0 to 1) MU (0) 0  
  
 
 
µ (1 to 2) MU (1) 1.50508 (18.22) 
  
 
 
µ (2 to 3) MU (2) 1.86967 (20.15) 
  
 
 
µ (3 to 4) MU (3) 2.61391 (21.14) 
  
 
 
µ (4 to 5) MU (4) 2.78739 (20.98) 
  
 
 
µ (5 to 6) MU (5) 4.67470 (14.69) 
  
 
 
Marginal effects 
    
 
 
Independent variable Prob (Y=0) t-value Prob (Y=6)  t-value 
 
PRVRI (at mean) -0.55997 (-3.75)   0.03821 (3.30)  
  
 
    
 
 
AIC 1787.60500 
   
 
 
LL function -886.80233 
   
 
 
N 600 (N= 60PVSPs×5experiments×2contracts) 
  
 
    
 
 
The results suggest that PRVRI has a strong statistical impact, i.e., both parameter estimates are 
significant at the one percent level, on the probability of choosing PPP as the most preferred 
procurement method.  The negative parameter estimate for Prob(Y=0) indicates that a one unit 
change in the mean of PRVRI leads to a -0.56 change in the probability of Y=0, i.e., one unit 
increase in PVSPs’ risk aversion reduces the probability of PPP being favoured by the agent by 
56 percent, ceteris paribus; the positive parameter estimate for Prob(Y=6) suggests the 
otherwise although at a much less magnitude, i.e., increase in one unit of the risk aversion 
increase the odds of non-PPP methods being chosen by four percent, ceteris paribus.  Overall, 
the results suggest that the greater the risk aversion of the private sector agent the less
Table 2
 preferred 
is the PPP model, hence Hypothesis 3 is not supported.  This outcome is substantiated by the 
way that PRVRI was calculated; it was based on participants’ prior experience.  The evidence 
shown in  has revealed that the risks had not been shared equitably across two sectors; 
such experience has significantly contributed to the finding that the risk-averse private sector 
agent would not choose the ownership concession in the presence of other alternatives.  The 
evidence goes to show that the assignment of property rights needs to be complemented with 
equitable risk allocation in order to warrant ex ante as well as ex post efficiency in a risk-sharing 
relationship.   
To investigate the incentive effect of property rights to encourage the agent invest efficiently ex 
ante, we first performed a simple linear regression model to establish that the agent is averse to 
unclear project objectives of the principal.  After the relationship is confirmed, we followed up 
with an ordered logit model to study whether the agent would prefer the ownership concession 
in the presence of risk of unclear project objectives:    
 
Hypothesis 4a PRVRI = 𝜷𝟎 +  𝜷𝟏 ∙ 𝑼𝑵𝑪_𝑫𝟐 
 
Hypothesis 4b Choice of PPP = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 ∙ 𝑼𝑵𝑪_𝑫𝟐 
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Results are shown in Table 7 (data input of “prior experience” from Table 2 was used for 
UNC_D2).  As expected, the risk will worsen the private sector agent’s risk aversion, parameter 
estimate of UNC_D2 in Panel A is positive which means higher the risk of unclear project 
objectives greater the risk aversion of the agent; this result supports Hypothesis 4a.  The positive 
(negative) parameter estimate associated with the marginal effect of Prob(Y=0) (Prob(Y=6)) 
under Panel B indicates that the higher the risk of unclear project objectives the more preferred 
is the PPP model by the agent, hence Hypothesis 4b is also supported.   
These results are consistent with the reverse-holdup problem with possible repercussion of ex 
post opportunism.  Although property rights elicit ex ante investments and determine the 
distribution of ex post surplus  (Grossman and Hart, 1986, p. 696), ex ante opportunism of 
overinvestment for non-contractible quality is expected when reverse-holdup occurs, i.e., when 
the principal has less incentive to bargain hard for low prices which is more likely when the 
transaction involves government (Wickelgren, 2007); and distortions to ex post distribution 
remain when contracting parties are risk-averse, because reservation of residual rights is most 
likely (Grossman and Hart, 1986, p. 717). 
As stated previously, reference to interview data shows that unclear project objectives by the 
public sector have in the past provided PVSPs with greater opportunities to exercise their own 
discretion in terms of project scope and delivery (the Sydney CCT is a case in point).  
Moreover, ex post opportunism was considered inevitable due to the inherent nature of private 
investments in mega infrastructure projects: 
 
Pg: Constructors and short term financial sponsors have too much 
influence over long term contractual matters to the detriment of the 
project’s viability.   
 
Ph:  [The resultant] PPPs create a tension between the need to create a 
winning bid scenario and the most likely ongoing operating 
conditions.   
 
Pi: In the recent projects, the private sector mispriced the risks 
therefore resulting huge losses to them.  The aggressive bidding 
process by the private consortium was driven by the desire to win a 
small number of projects offered to the market in an environment 
where there was over-supply of private capital.     
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Table 7:  Effect of unclear project objectives 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
 
Parameter t-value Adjusted R2 Hypothesis Support  Model 
 
Panel A (Hypothesis 4a: PRVRI = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1 ∙ 𝑈𝑁𝐶_𝐷2) 
PRVRI 
 
Constant  0.20295 (32.26) 0.06872 4a YES Simple 
linear 
regression  
UNC_D2 0.00153 (6.72)    
  N   
 
600 
    
Panel B (Hypothesis 4b: Choice of PPP = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑈𝑁𝐶_𝐷2) 
Choice of 
PPP 
Procure-
ment 
Model 
Constant  0.72181 (6.92) N/A 4b YES Ordered 
logit UNC_D2  -0.00899 (-2.36) N/A  
 Threshold parameters     
 µ (0 to 1) MU (0) 0    
  µ (1 to 2) MU (1) 1.48719 (18.15)   
  µ (2 to 3) MU (2) 1.84805 (20.07)   
  
 
µ (3 to 4) MU (3) 2.59356 (21.05)   
  
 
µ (4 to 5) MU (4) 2.76775 (20.90)   
  
 
µ (5 to 6) MU (5) 4.64902 (14.62)   
  
 
Marginal effects 
    
 
 
 
Independent variable Prob (Y=0) t-value Prob (Y=6)  t-value 
   UNC_D2 (at mean) 0.00208 (2.36)   -0.00014 (-2.23)    
 
      
 
 
AIC 1796.03700    
 
 
LL function -891.01858    
 
 
N  600    
                  
 
We performed two multivariate regressions to investigate the following effects: 
(i) the effect of property rights on the agent’s ex post operational efficiency; 
(ii) the effect of compensation structure on the risk preference of the agent and of the 
principal respectively; 
(iii) the effect of the public perception that the concession model transfers accountability on 
the risk preference of the agent and of the principal respectively. 
 
PRVRI = 𝜷𝟎 +  𝜷𝟏 ∙ 𝑻𝑷𝑹𝑰𝑪𝑬𝑻𝑫𝑷𝑽𝑺𝑷𝒔 + 𝜷𝟐 ∙ 𝑻𝑺𝑯𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑷𝑽𝑺𝑷𝒔 + 𝜷𝟑 ∙ 𝑷𝑽𝑶𝑾𝑵𝑻𝑷𝑽𝑺𝑷𝒔 
 
PUBRI = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 ∙ 𝑻𝑷𝑹𝑰𝑪𝑬𝑻𝑫𝑷𝑼𝑺𝑷𝒔 + 𝜷𝟐 ∙ 𝑻𝑺𝑯𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑷𝑼𝑺𝑷𝒔 + 𝜷𝟑 ∙ 𝑷𝑽𝑶𝑾𝑵𝑻𝑷𝑼𝑺𝑷𝒔 
 
where 
  
TPRICETD:  participants’ views on “proper toll pricing to manage traffic demand”;  
TSHARE:  participants’ views on “the sharing of toll revenue with the other party”; and 
PVOWNT:  participants’ view on “private ownership as a way of making it easier to 
charging users a toll”. 
Table 3 presents a summary of these independent variables; results of the regression models are 
listed in Table 8.   
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Table 8:  Effects of property rights on ownership-related risks 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable Parameter t-value 
Adjusted 
R2 Hypothesis Support Model 
 
Panel A: PRVRI = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑇𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑇𝐷𝑃𝑉𝑆𝑃𝑠 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑇𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑉𝑆𝑃𝑠 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑃𝑉𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑇𝑃𝑉𝑆𝑃𝑠 
PRVRI Constant 0.23384 (11.22) 0.02817 
  
Multivariate 
regression 
  TPRICETDPVSPs 0.01044 (3.28) 
 
5 NO 
 
TSHAREPVSPs -0.00672 (-2.25) 
 
7 YES 
 
PVOWNTPVSPs -0.00855 (-3.29) 
 
6a NO 
 
  N  600 
     
Panel B: PUBRI = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1 ∙ 𝑇𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑇𝐷𝑃𝑈𝑆𝑃𝑠 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑇𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑆𝑃𝑠 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑃𝑉𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑆𝑃𝑠 
PUBRI Constant 0.01391 (1.16) 0.20479 
  
Multivariate  
regression  
  TPRICETDPUSPs 0.00033 (0.18) 
   
 
TSHAREPUSPs 0.01064 (7.98) 
   
 
PVOWNTPUSPs 0.00393 (2.71) 
 
6b YES 
  N  410 
    
         
Contract theory asserts that ownership entitles the agent the residual right to adopt measures that 
would facilitate service delivery ex post; therefore the agent would welcome the autonomy to 
control toll pricing as an effective means to manage traffic demand.  However, the significant 
positive parameter estimate of TPRICETDPVSPs indicates that having the right to control toll 
pricing worsens the private sector agent’s risk aversion, although they considered private 
ownership would make charging users a toll easier (the significant negative parameter of 
PVOWNTPVSPs means this perception effect will lower the agent’s risk-aversion).  Therefore 
neither Hypothesis 5 nor Hypothesis 6a is supported.   
These contrasting effects show that economic incentives induced by property rights are being 
overpowered by politics surrounding the concession model.  There could be a number of 
reasons.  Reference to interview data indicates that due to the strong public adverseness to toll 
pricing, private proponents did not wish to be seen as using their right to set toll for private gain 
at the expense of the public purse, which may have a detrimental effect on patronage.  We have 
argued in our descriptive analysis that PPPs are not intended for managing traffic via the pricing 
mechanism but rather a means of project finance; the insignificant parameter of TPRICETDPUSPs 
in Table 8 has reinforced this intention.  The government principal’s strong aversion to sharing 
revenue with the agent as evidenced by the highly significant positive parameter of 
TSHAREPUSPs (0.01064), adds to support the proposition that governments did not consider toll 
pricing a means to earn the public sector a financial return.  Furthermore, the public perception 
that PPPs are a facilitator to transfer ownership-related risks by governments, such as those 
arising from public’s adverse preferences toward toll pricing will worsen the principal’s risk-
aversion.  The highly significant positive parameter of PVOWNTPUSPs suggests that if this 
perception persists, the concession model may no longer be a preferred procumbent to 
governments (Hypothesis 6b is strongly supported).  These findings suggest that the political 
considerations surrounding PPPs have caused the private agent’s reluctance on exercising their 
property rights to control toll pricing.  The reservation has generated an adverse ex post effect 
on allocative efficiency because road space is not rationalised on usage resulting in unintended 
consequences for society and for infrastructure planning, as one of the PUSPs commented:   
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Pj: In [some jurisdictions] the piecemeal process of toll road 
development has led to unintended consequences for road users 
where there is inequality in the cost of [using] roads.  The benefit of 
the toll road methodology coupled with user demand management 
could deliver the funding capability to significantly enhance [the 
city’s] public and private transport requirements. 
A further conclusion inferred from the effect of TSHAREPUSPs lends support to the rationale of 
PPPs that they essentially are a contract of long-term service provision.  The government 
principal desires to incite the agent to deliver quality service by bundling property rights into the 
construction and management of the asset.  In times of demand uncertainty, governments would 
bear the traffic risk.  The AM was designed to remove revenue uncertainty associated with 
usage for the agent so to encourage greater focus on non-revenue-enhancing performance effort 
such as service delivery and asset management.  We collected the agent’s preferences for the 
AM through a one-to-seven likert scale (see the descriptive statistics reported in Table 3).  The 
significant negative parameter associated with TSHAREPVSPs (-0.00672) reported in Table 8, 
i.e., revenue-sharing will reduce the agent’s risk-aversion, demonstrates that the agent favours 
revenue-sharing compensation structure as an incentive for ex post efficiency.  We further 
performed the following ordered logit model to test the effectiveness of the AM: 
 
Hypothesis 7:  AM = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 ∙ 𝑷𝑹𝑽𝑹𝑰 
 
If the AM is effective, the risk-averse agent would prefer the AM.  The results in the following 
table (Table 9) suggest the otherwise.  The marginal effects of -0.13 for Prob(Y=0) and 0.23 for 
Prob(Y=6) suggest that the more risk-averse is the private sector agent the less prefer is the AM; 
i.e., compensation structure with no revenue-sharing provision fails to induce non-revenue-
enhancing performance effort, thus Hypothesis 7 is not supported.  
  
Property rights, right to efficiency? 
Chung, Hensher & Rose 
 
36 
Table 9:  Risk aversion versus preference for availability model 
Dependent 
Variable  
(see Table 3) 
Independent 
Variable 
 
Parameter  t-value Hypothesis Support Model 
              
Hypothesis 7: AM = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 ∙ 𝑷𝑹𝑽𝑹𝑰 
AM 
  
Constant  1.63782 (9.48) 7 NO Ordered logit 
PRVRI  1.21517 (1.92) 
 
  
 
Threshold parameters  
   
 
µ (0 to 1) MU (0) 0 
   
 
 
µ (1 to 2) MU (1) 0.75994 (10.31) 
  
 
 
µ (2 to 3) MU (2) 1.04253 (13.74) 
  
 
 
µ (3 to 4) MU (3) 1.89818 (23.65) 
  
 
 
µ (4 to 5) MU (4) 2.26617 (27.30) 
  
 
 
µ (5 to 6) MU (5) 3.01077 (30.29) 
  
 
 
Marginal effects 
    
 
 
Independent variable Prob (Y=0) t-value Prob (Y=6)  t-value 
 
PRVRI (at mean) -0.13476 (-1.90)   0.22959 (1.92)  
  
 
    
 
 
AIC 2042.06900 
   
 
 
LL function -1014.03447 
   
 
 
N   550 
 
NB: (N= (60-5)PVSPs×5experiments×2contracts); 5 PVSPs took the pilot survey, questions related to AM and Land 
(see Figure 11) was added as the result of feedback from the pilot.  
  
 
    
 
Conclusion 
This paper has sought to empirically test on the theory of property rights to incentivise risk-
sharing amongst contracting parties within a choice experiment setting.  We have investigated 
this research question in a special area of application involving government as the principal – 
the PPP ownership concession model, to examine how conditions at the contract level, such as 
assignment of ownership and compensation structure, can induce the agent ex ante investment 
behaviour and exert ex post performance effort.   
One of the important empirical gaps in studies of contract pertains to the role risk plays in the 
choice of contract.  The impediment to performing tests of risk-sharing lies in the difficulty of 
obtaining data on individual risk preferences.  Many studies examining contracting parties’ 
choice of contractx or choice of compensation schemex either take risk preferences as given 
(Allen and Lueck, 1999; Martimort and Pouyet, 2008; Chen and Chiu, 2010) or use self-
reported measures (Gaynor and Gertler, 1995; Jin and Doloi, 2008).  In this paper, however, 
empirical data were collected by way of a SC experiment that is capable of capturing 
stakeholder preferences at the individual decision-maker level.  Choice models are employed to 
estimate a set of risk indices over a set of defined risk attributes.  These quantitatively derived 
indices empirically measure the risk preferences of all participants.  Our results clearly 
demonstrate that not only the private sector agent is risk-averse but the government principal is 
also risk-averse.  This result rejects the well-accepted proposition prevailing in the contracting 
literature that assumes the principal is risk-neutral.  Our results prove that any economic actor’s 
risk preference is highly contextual dependent.  Simply using a sweeping belief that the 
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principal is risk-neutral commits a serious flaw in contracting research and the resultant 
outcomes are potentially biased.     
The extent to which our results support the contracting theory limits to the proposition that 
contracting parties are indeed heterogeneous in risk preferences but only in terms of the degree 
of aversion to different risks, as illustrated by our results to Hypothesis 1 and 2.  It is these 
varying degrees of difference that play a decisive role in participants’ choice of contracts, and in 
understanding how the design of contract through allocation of risks, formulation of contractual 
conditions can facility contractual efficiency.  A number of strong messages emerge from our 
findings; i) assignment of property rights must be complemented by equitable risk-allocation in 
order to align the agent’s investment behaviour with that of the principal; ii) ownership transfer 
enhances ex ante efficiency in the presence of reverse-holdup in the meantime induces ex post 
opportunism, and iii) compensation structure linking risk-taking with revenue-sharing rewards 
can exert the agent’s non-revenue-enhancing performance effort for the welfare maximiser 
principal.   
An auxiliary contribution is the construction of PPPRI derived from the contribution of each 
underlying dimension of risk to the overall index of perceived risk.  The index is a 
behaviourally powerful, easy to understand instrument to evaluate the risk preferences of 
contracting parties.  Although the indices are derived from data that are primarily concerned 
with PPP tollroad concessions, the process of its derivation can be readily applied to other areas 
of risk management.  The PPPRI has great potentials.  It captures stakeholder perceptions of risk 
toward any specific project.  The effect of various attribute combinations in a risk-allocation 
package is achieved by varying the levels around the respondent specific RP inputs; the 
resulting utility indicators will convey the effect in the form of various risk perceptions toward 
the project.  Contracting parties then can weigh the tradeoffs between different risk 
combinations and decide what risks they wish to take on and what risks they can transfer, taking 
into account the risk premium they would require.  It can therefore be incorporated into a 
contract assessment regime that provides a meaningful measure of how risk perceptions can be 
balanced hence risk preferences can be managed by modifying the level of contractual 
conditions as well as policy and institutional variables.  We will leave the investigation of ways 
to optimise contract of risk-sharing for future research.   
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